Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 20 | Number 1

Article 5

1-1-1980

Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful
Access, and the Right to Adequate Education
Penelope A. Prevolos

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Penelope A. Prevolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 Santa Clara L. Rev.
75 (1980).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

RODRIGUEZ REVISITED: FEDERALISM,
MEANINGFUL ACCESS, AND THE RIGHT TO
ADEQUATE EDUCATION
Penelope A. Preovolos*
INTRODUCTION

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez'
was widely viewed as a death blow to reform efforts in education, at least on the federal level. Certainly, it would be a
mistake to pretend that Rodriguez was deeply sensitive to the
needs of the poor in public education. Nevertheless, the thesis
of this article is that it would be equally unfortunate to treat
Rodriguez as a command from the High Court that education
reformers abandon all hope.
The "unheld holding" of Rodriguez was that all Americans
have a right to an adequate education;2 the Rodriguez plaintiffs, the Court asserted, simply never denied that they were
being adequately educated. 3 The existence of a right to a minimum level of education is quite consistent with certain of the
Court's decisions in other fields, which will be styled, for want
of a more elegant appellation, the "access cases." These decisions, in the areas of voting, access to the courts, and access to
information and channels of communication, all share one or
more characteristics with education: they implicate issues of
group and individual wealth; they are in some way related to
first amendment concerns, or concerns about access to the political system; they occupy a special place in, and are in some
way a key to, the federal system; and they are characterized by
extraordinary levels of state involvement.
Rodriguez was a federalism decision-a decision about the
proper roles of the federal government and the states, the
courts and the legislatures-and not a decision about the existence or non-existence of a right to education. Therefore, if it
© 1979 by Penelope A. Preovolos
* A.B. University of California, Berkeley, 1976; J.D. Harvard Law School 1979.
Clerk to the Honorable Charles M. Merrill, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 1979-80.
1. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2. See text accompanying notes 6-26 infra.
3. 411 U.S. at 24.
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can be demonstrated that recognizing a right to adequate education would not be inconsistent with the Court's federalism
concerns, then education reform may not be far off. This article
contends that such a demonstration is possible, and involves
the following factors. First, education plays a key role'in the
federal system because state citizens are also federal citizens,
and must be educated in order to function as such. Second,
state citizens have political rights as national citizens, and
must be educated in order to have meaningful access to these
rights. Third, it is idle to posit that states bear no responsibility
for their citizens' federal role; the states are already deeply
enmeshed in education, and as they have chosen to act at all,
they should not be allowed to act in a way inimical to their
citizens' federal rights and responsibilities. Fourth, by recognizing a right to education in their constitutions, virtually all
the states have participated in creating a national expectation
of educational entitlement. Therefore, a federal decision to ensure that such justified expectations are met cannot be treated
by the states as either unexpected or inappropriate.
This article will argue that an affirmative state obligation
exists to provide an adequate level of education to all citizens,
and that such an obligation is consistent with the federalism
concerns expressed in Rodriguez.*The first section considers the
implications of the Rodriguez decision itself. The second examines the various analogies offered by the access cases and their
implications for a right to adequate education. The third section considers in detail the federalism issue raised by
Rodriguez. The fourth section examines the practical and legal
content of a right to adequate education.
KEY ASPECTS OF THE RODRIGUEZ DECISION

On March 21, 1973, the United States Supreme Court
handed down the Rodriguez decision, thereby provoking a wellnigh unparalleled wealth of critical commentary and reaction.'
4.

The following is a partial list of the literature dealing with Rodriguez and with

school finance issues generally: J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
(1966); J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PRIVATE WEALTH]; C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972); A. WISE,
(D.
RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS (1968); ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Moynihan & F. Mosteller eds. 1972); Billings & Leglar, FactorsAffecting Educational
Opportunity and Their Implications for School Finance Reform: an Empirical Study,
4 J. L. & EDUC. 633 (1975); Clune, Wealth Discriminationin School Finance,68 Nw.
U. L. REV. 651 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clune, School Finance]; Coons, Clune &
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Because the case was so widely discussed, its holding will not
be set out in this text.' However, two aspects of the case will
Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable ConstitutionalTest for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, Educational Opportunity]; Gard, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: On Our Way to Where?, 8 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1973); Goldstein,
InterdistrictInequalities in School Financing:A CriticalAnalysis of Serrano v. Priest
and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972); Grubb & Michelson, Public School
Finance in a Post-Serrano World, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 550 (1973); Kurland,
Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1968); Levin, Current Trends in School Finance
Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099; Lindquist & Wise,
Developments in Education Litigation: Equal Protection, 5 J. L. & EDUC. 1 (1976);
McDermott & Klein, The Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigation:Do Dollars Make a Difference?, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 415 (1974); Schoettle, The Equal
Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1355 (1971); Note, A
Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as YALE Note].
5. It is not possible to state the basic holding of Rodriguez, because the Court's
conclusions are complex, interrelated, and often dependent on separate stated or unstated assumptions. A skeletal sketch of the decision, however, appears roughly as
follows. The Rodriguez plaintiffs asserted that interdistrict inequalities of school funding violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. They alleged
that strict scrutiny of the Texas funding scheme was appropriate either because the
program disadvantaged a suspect class, or because education was a fundamental right
calling for heightened scrutiny.
In rejecting these claims, Justice Powell, writing for the Court, first concluded that
the disadvantaged class could not be identified in traditional equal protection terms,
411 U.S. at 22-23; thus, the nature of the deprivation was unclear:
[A]ppellees have made no effort to demonstrate that [the system] operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent
• . . there is no basis on the record in this case for assuming that the
poorest people-defined by reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Id.
Second, no absolute deprivation had occurred; Justice Powell asserted that such
a deprivation had characterized all previous "wealth discrimination" cases. Id. at 2022. Plaintiffs had failed to allege that any child was deprived of an education, id. at
23, and no proof was offered "persuasively discrediting or refuting the State's assertion" that "every child in every school district [was assured] an adequate education."
Id. at 24. Further, it was not clear that issues of cost correlated to issues of quality.
Id. Therefore, Justice Powell concluded, "the Texas system [did] not operate to the
peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class." Id. at 28. Strict scrutiny was therefore
inappropriate.
Justice Powell then turned to the fundamental interest issue, and concluded that
education is not a fundamental interest. The fundamentality of an interest depends
not on its "importance," id. at 30-31, but on whether it is "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34. Powell then analogized education to
other social welfare interests, and concluded that it was not so protected. Id. at 35.
Again, strict scrutiny was inappropriate.
Further, highly deferential review was appropriate when examining state fiscal
schemes because of their inherent complexity. Id. at 40-44. Educational policy also
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be considered in some detail: the Court's invocation of educational adequacy, and its concern with what may be styled issues of "federalism."
The Adequacy Issue
The Court's assertion that each Texas schoolchild received
a basic or adequate education may well have been central to
the holding of Rodriguez. Adequacy played a key role in both
the Court's determination that there was no suspect class' and
its determination that the right to education alleged in
Rodriguez was not fundamental.7 The opinion was apparently
required highly complex judgments and choices, and deference to the legislature was
thus doubly appropriate.
The Court then examined the Texas funding system to determine if it bore a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, and concluded in the affirmative.
The concern of this portion of the decision was local control; the need for local control
justified the heavy reliance on local property taxes for funding and the inequalities
which resulted. Id. at 49-56. The state had struck a rational balance between the
concern for assuring a basic education for every child in the state and providing a large
measure of local control by relying on the combination of local property tax funds and
the state Minimum Foundation School Program. Id. at 45-49.
Finally-and quite gratuitously-Justice Powell added what he referred to as a
"cautionary postscript." He warned that issues of financing and control of public
education were complex, and that it was not clear that a change in the system would
necessarily be beneficial; thus, deference to the legislature was appropriate. Id. at 58.
Justice Marshall entered a thorough and scathing dissent, id. at 70 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Brennan joined, id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White also entered a dissent in which Justices Douglas and Brennan joined, id. at
63 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall first argued that equality, not adequacy, was the issue; the Court
could not determine adequacy. Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nor was the costquality issue relevant; unequal provision of educational services was the proper focus
for constitutional inquiry. Id. at 84. Further, difficulty in identifying the disadvantaged group was irrelevant, because equal protection was violated whenever there was
discrimination against individual interests; here, those of children living in poor districts. Id. at 92.
Marshall's response to the Court's "fundamental interest" analysis was two-fold.
First, two-tier scrutiny was improper; "sliding scale" analysis which weighed the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and the
asserted State interests in support of the classification was preferred. Id. at 99, quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Second, Marshall asserted, rather undeniably, that precedent did not bear out the majority's claim
that fundamental interests included only those implicitly or explicitly referred to in
the Constitution. Education was fundamental. Id. at 111-17. Finally, there was a
suspect, politically underrepresented class. Id. at 118-24. In sum, the state interests
asserted could not justify the unequal educational opportunities provided to Texas
schoolchildren.
6. 411 U.S. at 18-29.
7. Id. at 29-39.
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influenced quite heavily by Professor Frank Michelman's seminal article arguing that equal protection envisions not actual
equality, but an affirmative obligation on the part of the state
to assure each individual a minimum, adequate amount of
certain basic goods and services. The Court may well have
concluded that only such an analysis could make the result of
Rodriguez palatable, not only to civil rights' advocates, education reformers, and the public, but to the Justices themselves.
Otherwise, it is difficult to understand the Court's emphasis on
the adequacy issue.
In its initial description of the Texas scheme, the Court
emphasized that aspect of the state system which allegedly
guaranteed an adequate education for all Texas schoolchildren.
Justice Powell described the Texas legislature's appointment,
in 1947, of a committee to explore funding alternatives that
would "guarantee a minimum or basic educational offering to
each child,"' and noted:
The Committee's efforts led to the passage of the GilmanAikin bills, named for the Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation Program.
Today, this Program accounts for approximately half of
the total educational expenditures in Texas. 0
The Court, in considering the suspect class issue, concluded that, unlike previous cases where wealth-related denials
were found to be suspect, this case involved no "absolute deprivation;" each child had the opportunity to receive a public
education, however unequal or inferior." The Court then
launched into its discussion of the adequacy issue, a discussion
that was unnecessary unless the previous wealth-related
cases-and in any event the case at issue-required more than
the absence of absolute deprivation.
The foregoing assertion is clarified by examining one of the
cases to which the Court analogized, Douglas v. California.1"
Douglas established an indigent criminal defendant's right to
court-appointed counsel on direct appeal. Nothing in Douglas,
however, required that adequate counsel be provided. If the
8. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969). See Lindquist & Wise, supra note 4, at 8.
9. 411 U.S. at 9.
10. Id. (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 18-29.
12. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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operative assumption of the Douglas Court was that all attorneys were "adequate," that conclusion was not suggested in the
opinion." The analogy to education, then, requires only that
public education be available to all; not that it be adequate.
Nonetheless, the Court discussed the adequacy issue, implicitly adopting Professor Michelman's thesi§ that the state has
an affirmative obligation to provide an adequate level of certain basic goods, here education and criminal process.
Moreover, the Court stated that "at least where wealth is
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absoIute equality or precisely equal advantages."' 4 This language is
far from an absolute deprivation analysis; it suggests that
something between absolute deprivation and absolute equality
is required for the Court to conclude that the wealth-based
disadvantage at issue is not suspect. Adequate provision of
relevant services was thus the basis for one of two rationales for
the Court's determination that no suspect class was disadvantaged in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The opinion
continued:
[T]he Texas legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, for
the welfare of the state as a whole, that all people shall
have at least an adequate program of education". . . The
State repeatedly asserted in its briefs in this Court that it
has fulfilled this desire and that it now assures "every child
in every school district an adequate education." No proof
was offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the
State's assertion."
The discussion of adequacy at this juncture also served
another purpose. It permitted an analytic end-run around the
cost-quality issue; that is, the notion that money spent is not
directly related to the quality of education obtained. The
Court's pronouncement in this context is worth setting out.
Apart from the unsettled and disputed question whether
the quality of education may be determined by the amount
of money expended for it, a sufficient answer to appellees'
argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality
or precisely equal advantages. Nor, indeed, in view of the
13.

See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity, supra note 4, at

14.
15.

411 U.S. at 24.
Id. (citations omitted).
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infinite variables affecting the education process, can any
system assure equal quality of education except in the
6
most relative sense.
Clearly, the cost-quality issue was not ignored. Indeed, because
of the cost-quality issue, even if equal education were constitutionally required it could not be provided, "except in the most
relative sense." (Exegesis of this last phrase is not easy; it may
mean that only equal facilities-dollars, teachers, classrooms,
etc.-can be provided, not equal learning.) Thus, only adequate education could realistically be required.
Such a conclusion does not really follow, however. Lindquist and Wise argue that "the principle utility of applying the
foundation or minimum-adequacy standard was to allow the
Court to escape from making any determination on the quality
of education received by poor children in Texas."' 7 However, a
minimal-adequacy standard does not seem to offer an escape
from the cost-quality dilemma. Lindquist and Wise assert:
To the extent that the adequacy or foundation standard of
equal opportunity is not merely another example of
"Holmesian deference" to state legislation, this standard
will draw the Court into the same quandries it so assiduously attempted to avoid . . . the adequacy standard
places the Court at the vortex of issues where "the scholars
and educators are divided . . . on even the most basic
questions."' 8
Therefore, it is argued, the real meaning of adequacy is deference; the Court simply will not question the adequacy of public
education, since to do so will involve precisely the complex
issues the Court seeks to avoid. 9 Such cynicism on the Court's
part need not be assumed, however.
As previously noted, the Court need not have included the
adequacy analysis at all. It could merely have asserted that all
individuals were afforded some public education, and that further inquiry would be inconsistent with the deference to the
legislature which is appropriate on such complex issues of state
fiscal and social policy. That the Court did not do this suggests
that it meant something more by adequacy than mere defer16.
17.

Id. at 23-24.

18.

Id. at 10 n.33.

19.

See 411 U.S. at 88-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Lindquist & Wise, supra note 4, at 10.
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ence. What, then is the meaning of adequacy'for the costquality dilemma?
The Court provided a clue to the answer later in its opinion, when it noted that "all would agree that there is a correlation [between expenditures and quality] up to the point of
providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic
."20 In fact, education and social science
opportunities ..
experts are sharply divided over the correlation between increased expenditures and increased learning. However, while
their conflict suggests that increased expenditures are not
sufficient to ensure increased (or adequate) learning, it is clear
that a minimal level of expenditures is necessary for increased
(or adequate) learning.
Thus, Rodriguez implies that if it could be demonstrated
that a particular school district's expenditures fell far short of
the state average, and that its "learning outputs" were equally
out of line," the Court might require increased spending as
necessary for adequacy, despite the relativistic elements in the
determination. Alternatively, a court concerned with adequacy
might look solely to educational results such as the presence of
a high proportion of functional illiterates among students in a
particular district, in concluding that adequate education had2
not been provided, without considering the cost issue at all.1
What is important to note here is that the Court's adequacy
standard can be more than empty rhetoric.
The adequacy standard played its second pivotal role in
the Court's discussion of education as a fundamental right. The
intimate relationship between education and the political
rights of voting and speech was conceded: "We need not dispute any of these propositions." 23 But, Justice Powell concluded,
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a
state's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of
education to any of its children, that argument provides no
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights
20. Id. at 47 n.101.
Further, this article will suggest that it is possible to define a minimally adequate
education without reference to expenditures, and thus without reference to the costquality issue. See text accompanying notes 175-99 infra.
21. See notes 175-80 and accompanying text infra.
22. See Gard, supra note 4, at 29-31. See also text accompanying notes 175-99
infra.
23. 411 U.S. at 36.
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where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case-no
chargefairly could be made that the system fails to provide
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of
speech and of full participationin the process."4
Thus, contrary to a popular misconception of the Rodriguez
holding, the Court did not decide that education is not a fundamental right, but that the facts of Rodriguez did not violate
that right.2 5 Furthermore, there is no right to equal education
per se, but there may be a right to whatever quantum of education is required for the meaningful exercise of other rights. For
example, if plaintiffs in a similar suit could demonstrate that
a significant number of persons in a district lacked the education necessary for meaningful exercise of political rights, the
Court might well find that a fundamental interest in education
had been infringed."
This analysis is buttressed by the fact that, as with the
absolute deprivation issue, the Court need not have raised the
adequacy issue at all. It could simply have held that the relationship between education and the relevant political rights,
while significant, was too indirect to be constitutionally cognizable, and that education therefore was not a fundamental
right. That the Court chose to rely on the adequacy issue,
rather than on an unequivocal holding that education is not a
fundamental right, is encouraging: a right to adequate education is in no sense foreclosed by Rodriguez.
The Federalism Theme
Federalism is a rather Delphic concept; it has meant different things to different courts. For the Rodriguez Court, it
apparently referred to the deference owed state legislatures by
federal courts and, by implication, the deference owed states
by the federal government. 7 It is important to understand the
24. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
25. See Gard, supra note 4, at 27.
26. See Lindquist & Wise, supra note 4, at 20-21.
27. The Burger Court has been notably solicitous of the rights of the states in
the federal system; it has required considerably greater deference to the states than
did its predecessor Court. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). And c.f.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
For an interpretation of National League of Cities particularly favorable to the
notion of affirmative state obligations, see Tribe, Unraveling National League of Ci-
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precise contours of the Court's federalism concerns in order to
understand, first, why a right to adequate education is not
necessarily inconsistent with this aspect of the Court's opinion,
and second, to the extent that the Court would perceive inconsistencies, why such a perception would not be correct.
The Court was disturbed by the federalism implications of
recognizing a fundamental right to education. Initially, the
Justices conceded the historic importance of education." They
quickly noted, however, that the importance of a state service
was constitutionally irrelevant. 9 Otherwise, the Court said,
"We would have gone far toward making this Court a 'superlegislature.' We would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative
role and one for which the Court lacks both authority and
competence." 30 Thus, the key to the constitutional status of a
particular right was not its "importance," but whether it was
"explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."', The
in the
Court does not "create substantive constitutional rights
3' 2
laws.
the
of
protection
equal
guaranteeing
name of
It is crucial to understand that federalism was the lynchpin of this sweeping rhetoric in order to avoid overestimating
its import. The Court's statements about limiting fundamental
rights to those "implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" make little sense outside this context. Thus, Justice
Marshall's stinging response to this portion of thie Court's analysis seems virtually irrefutable: "I would like to know where
the Constitution guarantees the right to procreate . . . or the
right to vote in state elections . . .or the right to an appeal
from a criminal conviction. '3 Clearly, fundamental rights had
not been limited prior to Rodriguez as Powell suggested. And
if Justice Powell meant instead to limit fundamental rights to
those already recognized when Rodriguez was decided, he offered no basis for doing so.
The Rodriguez Court's pronouncements on the
"fundamental rights" issue must therefore be understood in
light of its concern with federalism. The Court's real meaning
ties: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).

28. 411 U.S. at 30.
29. Id. at 30-31.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 100 (citations omitted). See Gard, supra note 4, at 28-29.
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must be that if the notion of fundamental rights is limited only
by the importance of a particular right, then virtually all important state functions implicate fundamental rights. Such a
result would be intolerable. Therefore, constitutionally protected fundamental rights have to be limited to those interests
that are in some way unique."
The Court's language about interests "explicitly or implicitly" guaranteed by the Constitution is either meaningless, or
cannot mean what it appears to mean. If "implicit" interests
include procreation,5 voting in state elections," and state criminal appeals,37 then it is unclear why they do not include education. If not, the Court's pronouncements about fundamental
interests are inconsistent with cases which it did not overrule.
The Court's real meaning must be that fundamental interests
will not be recognized unless they are sufficiently unique not
to threaten massive incursions on state legislative prerogatives
in the form of court suits alleging violations of other indistinguishable interests.
The federalism theme was repeated when the Court considered the argument that education should be constitutionally
protected because it preserves other constitutional rights.
While largely conceding the nexus between education and political rights, Justice Powell averred:
[T]he logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are
difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be
distinguished from the significant personal interests in the
basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination
might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, illclothed and ill-housed are the most ineffective participants in the political process, and that they derive the
least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment.
If so, appellees' thesis would cast serious' doubt on the
authority of Dandridgev. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v.
Normet, supra.31
Again the Court's opinion did not deny the close relationship
between education and political rights. Rather, the Court's
34. See text accompanying notes 149-74 infra.
35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
38. 411 U.S. at 37.
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concern was that this nexus did not sufficiently distinguish
education from other state services, and that recognition of
right would therefore threaten the
education as a fundamental
3
.
federalism
of
concept
The Court's final discussion of federalism in the context of
fundamental-interest analysis was its argument that because
the Texas education system was "affirmative" and
"reformatory," it should "be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the
rights reserved to the States under the Constitution.''40 This
distinction is not terribly persuasive. The Court argued that
the challenge here went to failure to extend a right. It contrasted Shapiro v. Thompson," where, it argued, the right to
travel was infringed. Shapiro, however, also could have been
viewed as a state failure to extend welfare. Only its concern for
federalism can explain the apparently illogical distinctions
drawn by the Court.
The Court explicitly turned to federalism in arguing the
appropriateness of the rational basis or deferential standard of
review. Justice Powell argued that the Court was being asked
to intrude on state funding decisions, "an area where the Court
has traditionally deferred to state legislatures."'" The logic of
this distinction is less than clear since Court decisions requiring school desegregation or lawyers for indigents may have an
even greater impact on the state fisc. The Court's federalism
concerns became even more overt:
It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the
relationship between national and state power under our
federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State's laws
are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial
scrutiny . . . . [I]t would be difficult to imagine a case
having a greater potential impact on our federal system
than the one now before us . . ..
The Court's absorption with the federalism issue is also
39. For a discussion of why education is distinguishable from other state social
welfare rights, see text accompanying notes 149-74 infra.

40. 411 U.S. at 39.
41. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
42. 411 U.S. at 40-41.
43. Id. at 44.
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illustrated by the fact that the Court added a final, apparently
gratuitous section to its opinion." This "postscript"' 5 emphasized that the complexity of issues presented by the case illustrated the wisdom of a federalism approach." Deference was
therefore justified, even though the Court did not place its
"judicial imprimatur" on the Texas system. 7
Without the lynchpin of federalism, many of the Court's
conclusions defy explanation. Thus, if a right to education can
be fashioned in such a way as to satisfactorily respond to the
Court's federalism concerns, obstacles posed by Rodriguez to
a right to education may be more apparent than real.
THE "MEANINGF L ACCESS" ANALOGY

In recent years, several strands of cases have emerged
which require that all individuals have what is variously defined as minimum, adequate, or meaningful access to particular rights or systems of rights. These cases have involved voting, access to information and to fora for self-expression, and
access to the courts. While in the Warren Court era these
strands of case law involved rather vague, general notions of
equalization, the Burger Court has narrowed and focused the
analysis so that a limited right of minimally adequate access
has emerged.'

8

The thesis of this section is that the analogy between these
various strands of "access" case law and the suggested right to
an adequate education is multifaceted and quite compelling.
The analogy strongly suggests the existence of a right to adequate education. The suggested elements of this analogy are:
1) political rights are implicated; 2) "national" or "federal"
interests are implicated; 3) there is a high level of government
involvement; and 4) wealth classifications are implicated.
Each of the current "adequate access" strands is characterized
by all or most of these elements; all are true of education.
While these elements inevitably overlap, they will each be
discussed separately in the interest of clarity. The analogy between existing access rights and the proposed right to an ade44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
U.S. 353

Id. at 56-59.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 58.
Compare Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1973) with Douglas v. California, 372
(1962) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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quate education will be considered in each of these four contexts.
The essence of two of the three lines of "access cases" is a
concern with guaranteeing meaningful access to certain political rights and to the political system. These cases deal respectively with the right to vote and with the first amendment
rights of access to information and to channels of communication. It is hardly a startling idea that meaningful access in
either of these two areas is illusory unless there is a concomitant right to adequate education. Nor is it much more of a
departure to argue that education is therefore not only linked
to, but analogous to, these rights; this point will be analyzed
in greater detail below. The voting cases and the access to
information and communication cases will be considered separately, although the analogy to education in each instance corresponds rather precisely to the analogy in the others.
Voting. In order to understand either the nexus between
education and voting or the analogy between education and
voting, it is necessary to see the right to vote as a right of
meaningful access to the political system.' 9 Thus, the precise
context of the voting cases will initially be discussed in some
detail; then, the relationship between voting and education
will be considered.
The cases that deal with the right to vote and with reapportionment, both in federal and state elections, are traditionally viewed as cases about equal political power. But the "one
man, one vote" standard 0 can readily be understood as a way
of giving each voter access to the political arena. That is, the
standard is not an arbitrary proclamation that a vote of precisely equal weight is constitutionally guaranteed, but rather
is the only effective way of guaranteeing that each individual
has meaningful access to the franchise. This analysis is appropriate for orie of two reasons. First, as Gerald Gunther suggests,
"one man, one vote" may be the only judicially manageable
standard available for ensuring meaningful access to the vote
49. See Schoettle, supra note 4, at 1366.
50. 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that, understood in historical context, Article I, §
2 means that "as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's." Id. at 8); 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (striking down Georgia's
county unit system in primary elections of statewide officers); 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(holding that the "Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." Id. at 568).
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for all citizens." Second, voting is in a sense analogous to a
zero-sum proposition; that is, one individual's vote is relevant
only in relation to the votes of others. Therefore, meaningful
access to the vote requires equal access to the vote; this seems
to have been the Reynolds Court's suggestion:
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society and any restrictions
on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibitingthe free exercise of the franchise .... 11
Similarly, Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors53 can' be
viewed as an access case. The focus of Harperwas not invidious
discrimination; the word discrimination seldom appeared in
the opinion. Rather, the case focused on denial of access to the
political process:
In a recent searching re-examination of the Equal Protection Clause, we held, as already noted, that "the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of
state legislators" is required. We decline to qualify that
principle by sustaining the poll tax.5"
The nexus between education and voting is apparent. An
individual who can read neither campaign literature nor his
ballot, and who cannot comprehend media coverage of candidates and issues, has access to the ballot only in an absurd
sense. He can, it is true, pull the lever or mark the card; but
this is hardly what Reynolds or Harper sought to achieve.
51. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1626 (9th ed.
1975).
See also Kurland, supra note 4, at 592-93. Professor Kurland suggests that the
"one man, one vote" standard, because it was a simple, readily comprehensible principle, was the sine qua non of the reapportionment cases' success. However, it is implicit
in his analysis that this standard was not required by the constitutional principle of
the cases; Kurland notes that the earlier cases purported not to require precise mathematical equality. Id. at 585-86. Rather, "one man, one vote" was a particularly effective means of implementing the principle arrived at: meaningful access.
52. 377 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added).
53. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper,the Supreme Court held that Virginia's $1.50
poll tax violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and ordered
that it be eliminated. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, suggested in dicta that
the right to vote in state elections might be "implicit, particularly by reason of the
First Amendment ..
" Id. at 665. In other words, the right to vote in state elections
was part of political expression, of the citizen's right to participate in the political
system.
54. Id. at 670 (citations omitted).
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The Rodriguez Court never denied the nexus between voting and education. It set forth the nexus argument in some
detail, and concluded that it "need not dispute . . . these

propositions."1 5 However, the Court stated, "[W]e have never
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee the citizenry

. . .

the most informed electoral choice." 56

But a meaningful electoral choice is guaranteed. The
Rodriguez Court explicitly avoided this issue by assuming that
Texas schoolchildren were being provided an adequate educa7
tion, and therefore meaningful electoral participation." The
Court cannot avoid the issue in this way for very long, however,
illiteracy and general
in view of the mounting rate of functional
58
schools.
our
of
institutional failure
The nexus between adequate education and meaningful
exercise of the franchise, to the extent that functional illiteracy
or something close to it is at issue, is so obvious that requiring
a statistical or sociological demonstration would not be justified.5
The more interesting analysis, however, is not the nexus
between education and voting, but the analogy between education and voting. That is, the major point is not that education
is necessary for the vote, but that it is analogous to the vote in
a constitutional scheme. The Rodriguez Court did not consider
this analysis.
The most rudimentary level of this argument is that, as
Justice Marshall suggested,"0 both education and voting are
"preservative of other rights" such as first amendment freedoms and a democratic system. Thus, the right to adequate
education should be understood as being analogous to the con411 U.S. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
See text accompanying notes 175-80 infra.
See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92d CONG.,
2D SEss., THE COSTS TO THE NATION OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION 46-47 (Comm. Print
1972); Lindquist & Wise, supra note 4, at 20 n.82.
Lindquist and Wise conclude:
Although the U.S. Supreme Court [in Rodriguez] was apparently unaware of much of this work, developmental psychologists have already
provided initial answers to many of these questions. Based on developmental theories, these research conclusions have begun to support Justice
Marshall's contention that there is a strong nexus between education and
an understanding of legal and political rights.
Id. at 21 n.82.
60. 411 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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stitutional status of voting in state elections. Neither is expressed in the constitution, but adequate rights to both should
be guaranteed.
A more subtle argument seems even more persuasive; it
requires identification of what it is our constitutional purpose
to protect. As discussed in some detail above, the point of the
voting cases was not to protect the right to vote or to an equal
vote, per se, but to ensure meaningful access to a federal political system. Adequate education should stand on the same
level.
First amendment interests-access to information and to
channels of communication. There is now a well-established
right of access to information. Recent Court decisions have
suggested that this right constitutes the primary content of
first amendment free speech guarantees. The seminal decision
in this area was Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,11where the
Court stated: "It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here." 62
The Supreme Court's decisions since Red Lion have emphasized this focus on a right of access. Thus, in FirstNational
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,63 the Court concluded that the corporate nature of the speaker was irrelevant." The proper focus
was on the public's interest in hearing the type of speech involved, which was, the Court concluded, "the type of speech
indispensable to decision-making in a democracy." 5 Buckley
v. Valeo60 was influenced in large measure by the public's interest in an undiminished quantity of speech. 7 Similarly, the recent commercial speech cases 6 were largely predicated on the
public's right of access to information. As the Bellotti Court
observed, "A commercial advertisement is constitutionally
protected not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the 'free flow
61. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
62. Id. at 390.
63. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
64. Id. at 776-77.
65. Id. at 777.
66. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., In Re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia Bd.of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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of commercial information.'""
As with voting, the nexus between education and speech
is something of a clich6. Clearly, the functional illiterate or the
individual with limited verbal skills lacks meaningful access to
most channels of information. Rodriguez did not deny this
proposition; it acknowledged the argument that "the corollary
right to receive information becomes little more than a hollow
privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available knowledge." 70 However, the Court
concluded, since Texas schoolchildren received adequate education, they presumably received adequate access to information.7 ' No such easy escape would be offered the Court in a suit
claiming the right to an adequate education for access to information purposes. Furthermore, the current social-science research regarding the effect of education on political attitudes
also suggests the key role of education in shaping political understanding and interpretation.72 Surely a right of access to
information must comprehend the ability to analyze and form
opinions about that information. But additional data about the
relationship between access to information and education does
not really seem necessary; it has become something of a truism,
3
one which even the Rodriguez Court did not attempt to deny.
While the nexus between education and access to information is not in great dispute, the analogy between the right of
access to information and the right to adequate education is
prone to a number of objections. It is also of potentially greater
constitutional significance because it does not subordinate
education to the right of access to information or give it only
indirect significance, as does the Rodriguez Court's nexus analysis. As in the voting context, what is contended for is an analogous, constitutional access right to adequate education; the
significance of the nexus point is merely to show that education
and access -to information implicate similar concerns.
The primary objection to the analogy is, of course, that the
speech cases did not require the government to finance an access right. Buckley, Bellotti and the commercial speech cases
merely proscribed government action that would limit access
to information. A right to adequate education, conversely,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

435
411
See
See
411

U.S. at 783 (citations omitted).
U.S. at 35.
Gard, supra note 4, at 36.
note 59 supra.
U.S. at 36.
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would require an affirmative obligation on the government's
part. However, there is more basis for the analogy than may be
initially apparent.
The requirement that government affirmatively provide
access to information is not nearly as startling as it may at first
4 upheld
seem. Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC"
the fairness
doctrine and a corollary right of reply doctrine which, while not
court-imposed, fulfilled a very similar function, specifically
identified as guaranteeing meaningful access to a broad spectrum of ideas. That function provided the Court with constitutional justification for the FCC's incursion upon the broadcast75
ers' discretion.
The pivotal case in this area was CBS v. Democratic National Committee.7" CBS is in many ways a problematic decision. The Court's ultimate holding was that the first amendment did not require broadcasters to sell time for editorial
advertisements. While at first blush the case appears a defeat
for the access right, in fact it strongly supports the analogy
between access to adequate education and access to information.
What the Court was relying upon in its decision was precisely a right to adequate, or minimal, access. The situation
was not one where th' Court concluded it was powerless to
remedy a lack of access to information by requiring that the
government assume affirmative obligations. Rather, the Court
concluded that the FCC's enforcement of the fairness doctrine
provided adequate access to information.77 The education analogy requires only that the Court insist upon provision of concomitant adequate access to education. The most encouraging
aspect of CBS is the fact that four Justices concluded that if
71
there were state action, then a right of access would obtain;
74. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
75. Id. at 375.
76. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
77. Id. at 125.
78. Justice Stewart concurred in the opinion of the Court because he concluded
that broadcaster actions were not state actions; if they were, however, he concluded
that a "common carrier" right of access would apply. 412 U.S. at 133-46 (Stewart, J.,

concurring). Justice Douglas, concurring, concluded that the "Government ... would
not, as I see it, be free to pick and choose such news items as it desired," id. at 149-50
(Douglas, J., concurring), and an access right would be required by the first amendment, id. at 150. However, Douglas accepted the Court's conclusion that broadcaster
action was not state action. Id. Justice Brennan, whom Justice Marshall joined, dis-

sented, and concluded that there was state action and that therefore a limited right of
access existed. Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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two Justices did not reach the question because they found no
state action.' The level of state involvement in education is
patent. Thus, by analogy to CBS, the state should not be permitted to educate in such a way as to deny some students
meaningful access to education, and therefore to information.
It may be argued that education is much farther removed
from the right to information than the CBS situation. But, if
the constitutional concern to be protected is meaningful access
to information (and not just a right to speak or hear), then the

remoteness distinction should be constitutionally irrelevant

since the right is being denied by the state in either event.
Furthermore, as it is the state that determines a child's ability
to receive and assimilate information from an early age, it has
a greater power over an individual's information right than
that found in CBS."
The right to adequate education is also linked to another
aspect of the first amendment: the individual's right to selfexpression. As one commentator pointed out,
The protection of the right to an adequate education is
supported by every consideration which has historically
buttressed the first amendment guarantee of free speech.
79.

J.).

Id. at 114-21 (Burger, C.J., joined on this issue by Stewart, J., and Rehnquist,

For a sampling of the most useful literature finding a first amendment right in
this context, see Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
Access
HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Canby, The FirstAmendment Right to Persuade:
to Radio and Television, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 723 (1972); Johnson & Weston, A
Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57
the First
VA. L. Rxv. 574 (1971); Malone, Broadcasting, the Reluctant Dragon: Will
MicH.
U.
5
Ideas?,
Controversial
of
Suppressing
the
End
Access
of
Right
Amendment
J. L. REF. 193 (1972).
An exhaustive listing of this literature can be found in Lange, The Role of the
and
Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review
Assessment, 52 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2 n.5 (1973).
the
80. Of course, the implication of CBS and of the literature surveyed in
preceding note is that, given sufficient state action, various speakers should be afand
forded an access right; education focuses on the listener's access. However, CBS
to
the commentators defend the access right on the basis of the listener's right
weaknotably
not
is
analogy
the
end-so
that
to
means
hear-the speaker is only the
ened by this distinction.
81. It should be noted that the first amendment access right is generally advosome
cated only where, due to scarce resources, the government must allot access in
the
since
analogy,
education
the
affect
not
does
this
However,
place.
first
way in the
government is controlling access to education there, as well. Indeed, for poor children,
there is no alternate source of access; Professor Clune has concluded that private
education is not feasible at income levels much under $12,000 a year. See Clune, School
Finance, supra note 4, at 693.
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The meaningful exercise of free speech is dependent upon
the speaker's ability to speak intelligently and knowledgeably, i.e., is dependent on the level of the speaker's educational achievement. The right of free speech is meaningless
unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts
knowingly and persuasively. Education is speech, just as
speech is always a form of education.8 2
In this area, as with voting and access to information, the
3
Rodriguez Court never denied the existence of a strong nexus.8
Instead, it relied on the assertion that all Texas schoolchildren
had received an education adequate for the exercise of first
amendment rights" and stated that the Court had never purported to guarantee "the most effective speech." 81 However,
such an argument is irrelevant for the individual who lacks
literacy or the basic verbal skills to communicate. As in voting,
the individual who lacks effective communication skills lacks
meaningful access to the political system. Social science data
regarding education and the development of political concepts
and attitudes supports this conclusion. 6 For the individual who
lacks the education to meaningfully form or express political or
personal preferences, our system of free expression is a political
and personal irrelevancy.
The argument for a right to adequate education by way of
an analogy to free speech guarantees is problematic. The government has not generally been required to provide channels of
communication. Nevertheless, CBS and the "public forum"
cases suggest such an analogy.87 The public forum cases held
that once an area-usually governmentally owned-had been
established as a public forum, only reasonable restrictions on
access could be imposed, and such restrictions could not discriminate between speakers. 8 The Justices who found an access right in CBS when state action was assumed were responding to a similar, "quasi-affirmative" sense of government obligation. Once the government provides a channel of communication to some individuals, denying that channel to other indi82.
83.

Gard, supra note 4, at 18.
411 U.S. at 36.

84. Id. at 36-37.
85. Id. at 36.
86. See note 59 supra.
87. See, e.g., Canby, supra note 79, at 746-58; Johnson & Westen, supra note 79,
at 609-20; Malone, supra note 79, at 219-52.
88. See, e.g., Johnson & Westen, supra note 79, at 609-20.
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viduals will be understood as an abridgement of the latter
group's speech rights. By analogy, if the state does not provide
education adequate for meaningful access to channels of communication to a portion of the student population, then the
speech rights of this group have been abridged.
The "Federal" or "National" System Aspect
Education is analogous to all three strands of access cases
in that it plays a key role in determining access to a national
system of rights and concerns. In fact, when voting and speech
interests are understood on their greatest level of generality,
education and these other two interests can all be seen as elements of access to the federal or national political system. This
is not necessary to the analogy, but makes it all the more compelling.
Free speech preserves the system. Free speech has been
most often defended in the cases as necessary to preserve a
"free marketplace of ideas,"'" allowing the most deserving
ideas to triumph. While this rubric does not adequately express
9
the full range of first amendment concerns, it does suggest a
crucial point. Once shorn of rhetoric, the focus of most cases
in the first amendment area is systemic, not individualistic.
That is, the individual's right to speak is significant in terms
of the political system, not in terms of vague notions of the
inalienable rights of each individual. Justice Brandeis concluded, in Whitney v. California," that "underlying the first
amendment guarantee is the assumption that free expression
is indispensable to the 'discovery and spread of political truth'92
people.""
and that the 'greatest menace to freedom is an inert

When Brandeis went beyond the free-market concept and defended free speech in terms of individual dignity, his focus was
still systemic. The essential tenet of the first amendment is
that
89. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United Stites, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-79 (1978); Barron,
supra note 79.
91. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
92. Id. See Barron, supra note 79, at 1648.
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it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope, and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies . ...

The underlying significance of free speech guarantees, then, is
preservation of the American political system.
Voting. Voting is also best understood in terms of the system. This is particularly clear in cases where the Court vindicated voting rights in the state context, with no explicit constitutional basis for doing so. Reynolds v. Sims,"4 although it concerned state apportionment and state elections only, was conceived of as vindicating the nationaldemocratic system: "The
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the
essence of a democratic society. . ...
Similarly, Reynolds
spoke of the right to vote as "preservative of all rights."" The
right to an equal vote in state elections existed because voting
is the essence of a democratic system; an interest of such national character could not be circumscribed by a state. Particularly in terms of citizens' expectations, a sharp division between state and federal voting systems was unrealistic; both
were part of a larger democratic whole.
Access to state courts. The case conferring a right of access
to state courts support the contention that the American system of justice is precisely that, a national system. These cases
cannot be explained solely in terms of reliance on the express
provisions of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; as Justice Rehnquist notes in Ross v. Moffitt, 7 the
Griffin v. Illinois" and Douglas v. California" line of cases did
not clearly rely on the due process clause.10° Indeed, Ross v.
""

93. 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
94. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
95. Id. at 555.
96. Id.
97. 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that Counsel need not be provided to an indigent
on his discretionary appeal to the United States Supreme Court).
98. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring that the state provide a transcript on appeal,
free of charge, to an indigent defendant where the state has made provision of the
transcript to the appellate court a precondition of appeal).
99. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (requiring that the state provide an indigent defendant
with court-appointed counsel for mandatory appeals).
100. "The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never
been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment." 417 U.S. at 608-09.
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Moffitt chose to rest the right of adequate access to state crimi-

0
nal appeals exclusively on equal protection guarantees.' ' Justice Rehnquist therefore must have identified this access right
as a preferred interest, deserving of special solicitude, on some
basis other than due process. That basis must be the special
significance of fair access to the courts in a democratic system.
At the same time, the Constitution has undeniably guaranteed a federal-state and national-system of justice. The
fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments create federal guarantees that are not amenable to being arbitrarily limited to federal courts. Citizens develop legitimate expectations that
courts must vindicate regardless of delicate distinctions between state and federal authority, because citizens correctly
conceive of the system as a national one.
Education similarly implicates the federal system and federal guarantees. It does so in more complex ways than are
usually elaborated. First, education, like the political rights of
speech and voting, is seen as essential to the preservation of our
national democracy because it is the sine qua non of meaningful political participation, an issue Rodriguez dodged by relying on the adequacy argument. 02 Justice Frankfurter wrote,
"The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and
the most persuasive means for promoting our common destiny;"' 13 Justice Brennan asserted that "Americans regard the
public schools as a most vital institution for the preservation
' 4
of the democratic system of government."' More prosaic, but
perhaps more illuminating, is the Court's statement in
Wisconsin v. Yoder"°5 that "some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system . . . . "1 If the essential
concern is meaningful access to the political system, education
should be regarded not as a mere conduit to voting and speech,
but should stand on the same plane as these rights. Internalization of democratic ideals, understanding of political issues, and
political knowledge and sophistication are as essential for

101.
102.
103.
furter, J.,
104.
curring).
105.
106.

Id. at 611.
411 U.S. at 36-37.
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankconcurring).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J., con406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 221.
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meaningful access to the political system as speech or the franchise. This may be the partial import of the Court's references
to the classroom as the "marketplace of ideas.'107
Second, like first amendment rights, education may be key
to the preservation of a stable society, but in a different way.
As one commentator has expressed it, "education, by enabling
an individual to compete economically . . . is essential to the
free enterprise democracy America prizes and thus is vital to
the economic survival of the nation in the world marketplace." "'' 8 The Yoder Court declared that "education prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
society." 09
Third, as with voting and criminal justice, citizens conceive of education as a national right, quintessentially a part
of the American conception of democracy. As one commentator
noted, the American democratic ideal is "a society in which
social class is not inherited and in which parents can enjoy the
notion that their children have unlimited opportunity for professional achievement and financial reward."" 0 A right to adequate education is thus implicit in democratic ideals of social
mobility; while equal education may be partly at odds with the
countervailing competitive ideal, adequate education is quite
compatible with the Horatio Alger model. The fact that the
overwhelming majority of states guarantee public education in
their constitutions, and most provide it, gives considerable
substance to citizens' expectation that all Americans are guaranteed an adequate education."' That the Supreme Court has
never explicitly recognized a federal constitutional right to
education is hardly an adequate response since this was equally
true of the right to a meaningful state franchise until a little
over a decade ago.
It is a characteristic of the adequate access cases, then,
that they implicate strong national systemic concerns. Education may well serve as a pardigm for a right which implicates
such concerns; thus, this aspect of the analogy to other access
cases strongly supports recognition of a right to adequate education.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Keyishian v. Board of Regents of N.Y. Univ., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Gard, supra note 4, at 19.
406 U.S. at 221.
Schoettle, supra note 4, at 1357.
See text accompanying notes 158-66 infra.
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The Characteristicof State Involvement
It is hardly a revelation that voting, court systems, and the
public forum aspect of first amendment access are all characterized by high levels of government involvement, and the
point will not be belabored here. However, the constitutional
implications of this aspect of the access cases, and their significance for the proposed right to adequate education, are worthy
of some discussion.
Access to the courts. The cases dealing with access to state
criminal appeals attached considerable significance to this
2
issue. In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court emphasized the intensity of state action involved-the state required a transcript for
appeals, and the state required the defendant to pay for it."'
The level of state action in education is at least as
great-education is compulsory; it has a great influence in
shaping the individual's character and his or her future, and
the state determines, or delegates responsibility for determin4
ing, the kind of education the individual will receive."
Apportionment cases. The analogy between education and
the apportionment cases is also quite strong. Reynolds v.
Sims" 5 emphasized that the state was responsible for the
boundaries drawn, and hence the dilution of some individuals'
votes. Similarly, the state creates school districts and mandates reliance on property tax revenue; thus, it is the state
which is largely responsible for the denial of adequate education to students in particular districts."'
Access to public fora. The Supreme Court's analysis in
7
CBS v. Democratic National Committee" is also relevant.
There, four of the Justices suggested that if broadcasting were
imbued with state action, then the first amendment would
require the extension of an access right to would-be speakers."'
It is probably fair to assume that the presence of state action
112. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Dis113. Id. at 24-25. See Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth
289, 297
criminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REv.
[hereinafter cited as Clune, Wealth Discrimination].
at
114. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, EducationalOpportunity, supra note 4,
388-89.
115. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
1, 123-24
116. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
118. See note 78 supra.
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would also constitutionalize the fairness doctrine and its corollary right-of-reply doctrine, in order to vindicate the public
interest in access to information (since all speakers could not
be heard). The analogy to education is apparent-education is
clearly state action. For the relatively poor, it is state action
from which there is no escape. The only way to guarantee
meaningful access to information, to channels of communication, and to the federal political system is to implement a right
to adequate education. The public forum cases can be read to
support this analogy as well.
In addition to these specific analogies, another element of
the state's involvement in education should be highlighted.
The compulsory nature of public education is important; it
emphasizes the state's power over the individual in this context, and argues for a concomitant responsibility on the state's
part to provide a meaningful return for the time and effort
exacted."'
Wealth Classifications
All three strands of cases that identify rights of adequate
access at one point or another implicate wealth classifications.
This is clearly true of education as well. While wealth itself has
never been held suspect for the purpose of equal protection
analysis, it is clear that concern about unique disadvantages
visited upon the poor has animated the Court's adequate access decisions. This may be so because the wealth aspect has
made the unfairness of a given deprivation particularly patent,
because of concerns about the political powerlessness of the
poor, or, as seems most likely, a combination of the two. In any
event, both lines of reasoning add considerable impetus to the
claim for a right to adequate education.
Educational deprivation is connected to lack of wealth.
Poor people tend to cluster together in poor districts. Poor districts often have less revenue to spend on education. While the
cost-quality issue is disputed, it is clear that adequate dollars
are necessary, although perhaps not sufficient, for adequate
education.2 0 Poor people are therefore more likely to be deprived of adequate education.
119.

See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, EducationalOpportunity, supra note 4, at

120.

See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 520.

388.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

The Rodriguez Court rejected this argument, because it
found that the affidavit primarily relied upon to demonstrate
the relationship between individual and district wealth had
2
employed faulty methodology.' ' However, subsequent research
has in turn revealed serious flaws in the study relied upon by
the Court.' 2 Strong correlations have been found between district and individual wealth in recent, exhaustive studies under23
taken in California, Texas and Illinois.' Indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that this "firm factual basis
for a finding of wealth suspectness offers a substantial incenCourt again."' 2 4
tive for bringing the Rodriguez cause before the
The point here is far more modest; wealth suspectness is not
contended for. Rather, as in the other access cases, the Court
should simply be sensitive to the possibility of intensified deprivation and political powerlessness posed by the relative
wealth issue. With this preliminary understanding established,
the role of wealth issues in the adequate access context can now
be examined in some detail.
Speech is less free for the poor. The Court has repeatedly
flagged wealth concerns in the first amendment access cases.
In CBS, the Court professed a reluctance to grant an access
right to prospective editorial advertisers since
the public interest in providing access to the marketplace
of "ideas and experience" would scarcely be served by a
121. 411 U.S. at 23.
at 1328-29, which
122. The Court relied heavily on the YALE Note, supra note 4,
lived in poor districts.
concluded that it was incorrect to assume that poor individuals
The Note was based on a study of Connecticut school districts.
and in its
The Note has been critized as incorrect both in its statistical inferences
of the
re-analysis
After
552.
at
4,
note
supra
Michelson,
theoretical analysis. Grubb &
as data for Maryland,
well
as
Connecticut,
in
financing
school
on
data
statistical
the opposite conMassachusetts and South Carolina, Grubb and Michelson reached
individual and
clusion from the YALE Note; they found a high correlation between
district wealth. Id. at 559.
utilizing data on
123. A study funded by the National Institute of Education,
statistically
found
districts
school
unified
all Texas school districts and all California
& ARCINIEGA, INEQUALIBmscHETro
respectively).
.34,
and
(.40
correlations
significant
AND THE POOR IN TEXAS
TIES IN EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES: THEIR IMPACT ON MINORMES
Nov. 1974).
AND CALIFORNIA (NIE Grant No. NE-G-3-0062,

than had been
John Clune, using a somewhat more sophisticated methodology
in a single measure in
employed in previous studies, combined property and finance
almost perfect correhis exhaustive study of school finance in Illinois. Clune found an
Clune, School Finance,
lation between individual wealth and district expenditures.
supra note 4, at 684-95.
124. Clune, School Finance, supra note 4, at 693.
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system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to wealth.'

The Court added that a right of free reply would not necessarily
solve the problem, since the affluent would still be able to
determine the issues to be discussed. Thus, the "public trustee" approach was a preferable means for securing adequate
access to information for all interests.'26 The analogy to education is not particularly elusive: Poor children are the least
likely to enjoy an adequate education. Therefore, poor children
are the least likely to have adequate access to information; the
fairness doctrine is less accessible to listeners who are unable
to comprehend the ideas communicated. Furthermore, to the
extent that the poor would be likely to communicate unique
ideas, if they are deprived of adequate education, they would
be unable to communicate effectively, and the "marketplace of
ideas" will be deprived of their ideas.
The so-called commercial speech cases demonstrated a
particular solicitousness for the poor's interest in access to information. The Court's analysis was that advertising is particularly important to the poor, since they have a special need to
learn where their basic needs (drugs or legal services, for example) can be economically satisfied.'27 Thus, the limitations on
advertising in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
2 or
Consumer Council, Inc."'
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona'
125. 412 U.S. at 123. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392
(1969).
126. 412 U.S. at 125.
127. See Note, Access of the Poor to Basic Economic Needs: A New Concern in
Freedom of Speech Decisions, 54 IND. L.J. 83 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Access
of the Poor].
128. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court that
[t]hose whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits
the hardest are the poor. . . . When drug prices vary as strikingly as they
do, information as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of
basic necessities.
Id. at 763-64.
129. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The opinion noted: "Among the reasons for underutilization [of lawyers] is fear of the cost. . . . The disciplinary rule at issue likely has
served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and the
unknowledgeable." Id. at 376-77.
As one commentator has noted, this reference to the "not-quite-poor" assumes
that the truly poor have access to government-financed legal aid programs, an assumption which is not necessarily accurate. Note, Access of the Poor, supra note 127, at 89
n.33. However, as this commentator notes, "Even assuming such access ... the emphasis in the Bates approach remains on how the least well-off potential clients of
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had a particularly detrimental effect on poor people. 3 " Similarly, to the extent that poor individuals are denied adequate
education, they often will not have effective access to the consumer information regarding the price and quality of basic
services for which they have a particularly desperate need.
They may be unable to comprehend the advertising which the
Court protected.
Court access and the poor. The court access cases particularly emphasize wealth issues. Griffin v. Illinois3' and Douglas
v. California3 ' are replete with language which seems to imply
that wealth classifications are constitutionally suspect; there is
little doubt that these are cases about poverty. 3 3 While the
Burger Court's decision in Ross v. Moffitt"' explicitly defines
the right as one of adequate access, and rejects the suspectness
suggestion, the focus on poverty remains: "The duty of the
State . . . [is] to assure the indigent defendant an adequate
15 John Clune has sugopportunity to present his claims. . . ...
gested that the pivotal significance of wealth in these cases was
due to a sense that poor people, already disadvantaged by democratic society in various ways, and here subjected to the coercive power of the state, should not incur additional disadvantages in this context because of their poverty.' 3 Clune views the
"centrality of fair criminal process to democratic institutions"
and the "intensity of state action involved" as particularly
private legal offices stand to gain the most from price advertising." Id.
130. See notes 128 & 129 supra. See Note, Access of the Poor, supra note 127.
131. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
132. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
133. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Griffin, declared:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color. . . . There is no meaningful
distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend
themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an
adequate appellate review ....
351 U.S. at 17-18.
Similarly, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in Douglas that:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record . . . while the indigent . . . is forced to
shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors
are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man
has a meaningful appeal.
372 U.S. at 357-58.
134. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
135. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
136. Clune, Wealth Discrimination,supra note 113, at 296-97.
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significant. 31
The analogy to education is suggestive. The state, presumably, has drawn districts and legislated educational financing
plans which disadvantage the poor individual. Education is
central to democratic processes in all the ways suggested
above. For these same reasons, the poor lack meaningful access
to the "democratic processes" which have determined the kind
of education they will receive. And the coercive power of the
state is great. Compulsory education laws, coupled with the
inability of poor people to "opt out" of the public system, make
the system mandatory as to the poor.' 38 As in the criminal
process, all these factors support the state's obligation to provide meaningful access to "fair," adequate education.
The political franchise. In many ways, the voting cases
offer the most significant analogy to education in the poverty
context. Harper v. Virginia Board of Electors' emphasized
that poverty should be irrelevant to access to the franchise, and
held Virginia's poll tax unconstitutional. 4 0 Harperis important
in rebutting one argument often advanced for the proposition
that education does not implicate wealth issues: the argument
that some poor children live in wealthy districts; some poor
children receive adequate educations; and conversely, some
non-poor children live in poor districts or are denied adequate
education. This, however, precisely parallels Harper. Some
non-poor voters were undoubtedly disenfranchised by unwillingness to pay the poll tax although they were able to do so;
these non-poor voters would be granted access to the ballot by
the Harper result. The significance of poverty was not to require enfranchisement of a suspect class, but to demonstrate
the inappropriateness of permitting wealth to be implicated at
all in a process so vital to the legitimacy of the democratic
system as voting."' Similarly, the impact of wealth on the individual's likelihood of obtaining adequate education, and therefore on the individual's likelihood of having meaningful access
to the political system, should be profoundly disturbing.
Another voting case, Kramer v. Union FreeSchool District
No. 15, 1 does not involve wealth issues but suggests a crucial
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 297.
See PRIVATE WEALTH, supra note 4, at 388-89.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
See note 53 supra.
See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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point about poverty, education, and the democratic system. In
rejecting the traditional posture of deference to state legislatures, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval
given "rational" classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of
state government are structured so as to represent fairly all
the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is
in effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality."'
For related reasons, the state legislative process does not
adequately protect the educational interests of the poor. The
argument is rather complex; it will be referred to, rather inelegantly, as "The Cycle of Non-Access." The first point is that
the poor are a political minority, particularly in the education
context. The relatively privileged are eager to perpetuate their
privileged status into the next generation. Therefore, it is in
their interest to perpetuate the educational deprivation of poor
people. " ' Second, a variety of factors converge to deny the poor
meaningful access to the political process to alter the educational distribution: because they have by and large been denied
adequate education, they lack effective access to information
about such things as the intricacies of current school finance
laws or proposals. They are therefore unlikely to effectively use
their vote to secure educational reform. Lack of education also
undercuts their access to effective channels to communicate
with others with parallel interests in educational reform efforts.
Their very poverty inhibits access to channels of communication and ability to win elections, an effect which the Court's
5
decisions in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti' and
Buckley v. Valeol" can be expected to exacerbate.
could not
143. Id. at 628. Kramer held that the vote in school district elections
schools.
the
in
enrolled
children
had
or
property
owned
either
who
those
to
be limited
voting
since
context,
this
in
incorrect
probably
is
The argument quoted in the text
was not
elections,
district
school
in
vote
should
who
decided
which
legislature,
the
for
challenged. However, as a general principle, the argument seems quite logical.
144. See Clune, School Finance, supra note 4, at 667-68.
speakers
145. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Bellotti held that the speech of corporate
of Bellotti
could not be limited consistently with the first amendment. The exegesis
be restrained
may well be, therefore, that the speech of the relatively wealthy cannot
in order to prevent "drowning out" of the relatively poor.
expendi146. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley struck down certain contribution and
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The effect of the foregoing is to create a cycle of deprivation. The children of the poor will, in their turn, be unable to
secure an adequate education for their children through the
political process. The injustice of such a cycle should be manifest.
Equal education. Several things should be noted about
this article's analysis. Its logical force suggests equal education,
not adequate education.The implication is that education, and
for that matter, speech, are relevant largely in competitive
terms: what is significant is the political influence of one individual relative to another; the earning power, and therefore the
access to channels of communication of one individual relative
to another; and so forth." 7 To this extent, as with the vote, a
meaningful education is an equal education. Yet, for the reasons discussed in the final section of this article, we are not yet
in a position to guarantee equal education to all. The "Cycle
of Non-Access" remains relevant because the issue is not absolute. A minimally adequate education can still be understood
to have some content, and even some increase in the poor's
access to the political process is significant. Education is not
meaningful solely in the relative terms, but a full understanding of the contours of the problem does require appreciation of
its relativistic aspects.
Awareness of the potentially relativistic nature of the
problem, however, should not undercut the importance of adequate education to the "Cycle of Non-Access" problem. For the
most immediate and appalling aspect of the problem is the
denial of even adequate education, a denial that is rationalized
on the basis of political access. Inequalities will be dealt with
through legislative reform," 8 but adequate education is a precondition for reform.
THE FEDERALISM ISSUE

Federalism concerns were at the heart of the Court's deciture limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as violative of the first
amendment. As with Bellotti, the implication is that the expenditures of the relatively
wealthy for political activity cannot be limited in order to provide for effective political
activity by the relatively poor.
The most disturbing facet of the two decisions may be, not their results, but their
demonstrated insensitivity to the needs of the poor in the political process.
147. See Lindquist & Wise, supra note 4, at 32 n.150 (arguing that in a competitive society, equality, not adequacy, is necessary).
148. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
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sion in Rodriguez, and the essence of these concerns was the
fear that recognition of education as a preferred right and concomitant Court intervention in state educational systems
would lead to similar court involvement in all state services.
This would be true particularly in housing and welfare, because
these services were considered indistinguishable from education.' 9 The thesis of this article is that, at least with regard to
a right to adequate education, these concerns are unfounded;
education stands on a constitutionally distinct plane from
other state services.
There are several reasons for this assertion. First, there is
sound historical basis for the argument that education occupies
a special place in the constitutional plan. Second, the states
recognized the primacy of the education right, and there is
evidence that they do so on the basis of its significance in the
federal democratic scheme. As the states themselves recognize
education to be a federal right and a federal concern it is difficult to see federal protection of this right as an illegitimate
encroachment on state sovereignty. Third, adequate education
is perceived as a national right, particularly because of its significance in the federal system. Such citizen expectations
should be vindicated. Fourth, since education is characterized
by a unique level of state power over individuals, the state
should not be allowed to act in a way which burdens its citizens' exercise of federal constitutional rights.
Education and its historical context. The Supreme Court
has frequently recognized that there are elements inherent in
the constitutional plan which are not explicitly mentioned;
various aspects of sovereign immunity' 0 and of federalism itself 5' are examples, as is the right to travel.'52 There is historical, as well as logical, force to the argument that adequate
education is such a right. The Confederate Congress declared
its commitment to education in 1787 in the Northwest Ordinance, two years before the United States Constitution was
149. See text accompanying notes 27-45 supra.
150. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 99 S. Ct. 1182, 1194 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
151. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating. federal minimum wage for state employees as threatening states' "ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id. at 852)
152. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). "[Tihe nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
... Id. at 629.
citizens be free to travel.
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adopted.'53 There is no reason to believe that the failure to.
include a guarantee of public education in the Constitution
evinced an abandonment of the earlier commitment. One commentator wrote:
Clearly the omission of this specific guarantee was due
either to the belief that such a guarantee was unnecessary
because of the popular support and approval of the Northwest Ordinance, or to the belief that such a right was assumed to be within a broader, more general constitutional
guarantee. '
The same commentator notes that such a view receives support
from the fact that several of the founding fathers professed the
belief that education was essential to the maintenance of a
federal democracy.' The right to adequate education thus
may have been thought to inhere in the constitutional blueprint.
Moreover, the significance of education to the federal system and the states' obligation to provide adequate education
as part of their role in that system has been repeatedly recognized. Congress required that the Confederate states guarantee
public education to all citizens as a precondition of those
states' readmission to the Union. 5 ' The thirty-ninth Congress,
which drafted the fourteenth amendment, referred to public
education in various enactments as a fundamental tenet of
Republicanism.'57 It is therefore possible to make a strong argument to the Court that a right to adequate education need not
menace the federalism concerns of which the Court is so solicitous, and which underlay its decision in Rodriguez. It is appropriate that the Court reenter the education arena, recognizing
and examining the content of an affirmative state obligation in
education.
Education is part of the federal scheme. The position of
the states with regard to the right to adequate education is also
significant to the federalism issue, and to the constitutional
uniqueness of education as compared to other state services.
All the states have at one time guaranteed a right to public
153. 1 U.S.C. XXXIX (1958).
154. Gard, supra note 4, at 11.
155. Id. at 11-12.
156. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220 & n.9 (1948).
157. See, e.g., Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866); Act of March
2, 1867, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 434 (1867).
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education in their constitutions," 8 although three have added
amendments to eliminate the mandatory provision for public
education in an (unsuccessful) attempt to evade Brown v.
Board of Education.'5 Although the terminology varies, most
of these state constitutional provisions imply a guarantee of
adequate education.'" Significantly, less than a handful of
state constitutions include guarantees related to public health,
housing, or welfare.' 6'
A number of states explicitly predicate their education
guarantees on the importance of education to a federal system
of government," 2 the maintenance of Republican rights and
responsibilities,' 3 the rights and liberties of the people,'"4
and/or the stability of government." 5
158. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art.
IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XII, §
1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2-6401; HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §
1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 12; KAN.
CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, §
1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, §
2; MIN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MIss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a);
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEs. CONST. art. VII, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147; OHIO CONST. art.
VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ORE. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, §
14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S. D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12;
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 64; VA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art.

X, § 3; WYo. CONST. art. VII, § I.
159.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

The three states are Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina. The Alabama
Constitution, article XIV, § 256 provides for the establishment of free schools, but has
been amended to specifically provide that there is "no right to education or training
" The Mississippi Constitution, article VIII, § 201 was
at public expense ..
amended in 1960 to provide that the legislature's decision to provide public schools was
discretionary. South Carolina has specifically eliminated the section of its constitution
that provided for free public schools. S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 5, eliminated by S.C.CoDE
2223 (1952) and S.C. CODE 1695 (Cum. Supp. 1960).
160. See Comment, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: A
Study of Alternatives Open to State Courts, 8 U.S.F. L. REv. 90, 111 (1973). And see
Gard, supra note 4, at 12-13.
161. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5 (legislature shall provide for public
health and welfare); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII (special welfare), art. XVIII (housing).
162. MASS. CONST. part 2, ch. 5, § 2.
N.H. CONST. part 2, art. 83.
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147.
165. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
The eight other similar state constitutional provisions are: ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME.
163.
164.
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The essential point is that the states themselves do not
regard education as a parochial state concern; rather, they accord it paramount importance because it is crucial to the federal system, to the preservation of a system of government of
which the states are a part. It therefore seems anomalous to
view federal constitutional protection of the right to education
as an improper intrusion into state concerns, as did the
Rodriguez Court.
An Expectation of Education
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Hall v. Nevada, argued,
Any document-particularly a constitution-is built on
certain postulates or assumptions; it draws on shared experience and common understanding . . .when the Constitution is ambiguous or silent on a particular issue, this
Court has often relied on notions of a constituional
plan-the implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to make the Constitution a workable
governing charter. ....
"I
The fact that public education is guaranteed in virtually every
state creates a common understanding that education is a national entitlement consistent with the democratic system of
government. A number of states explicitly predicate this understanding on the importance of education to the national
government." 7 Interpretation of the United States Constitution
should not be blind to such expectations, but should seek to
vindicate them.
Furthermore, the Court has recognized the peoples' sense
that education is an important national interest: "Americans
regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government.' '1 8 While
housing and welfare interests are of crucial importance to the
individual, they have never been deemed to have the significance in the federal system which the Court, the states and the
American people accord education. This consensus sets education apart specifically with regard to its place in the federal
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a); TEx.
CONST. art. VII, § 1.
166. 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1194 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. See notes 162-65 and accompanying text supra.
168. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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system and should allay the Rodriguez federalism concerns.
It can be argued that housing or welfare are as important
to the federal system as education; that underfed, unsheltered
or unclothed citizens are discouraged from effectively participating in the federal political system."' In response, two things
should be noted. First, the connection with federal concerns
seems both less direct and less absolute; ill-fed, ill-sheltered or
ill-clothed citizens may be politically apathetic, but they are
not as incapable of meaningfully participating in the political
system as the individual who cannot read. Second, the historical and constitutional basis for these other social welfare rights
is not comparable to that supporting a right to education.
Surely, regret that there is no clear constitutional basis for a
right to housing or welfare should not lead us to abandon efforts
to secure recognition of a right to education, for which there is
a strong constitutional basis.
Education is unique in the intensity of state action
involved.' The implications of the state-action factor for the
federal system are quite significant. First, unlike any other
state service,"' education is compulsory. Many citizens have no
alternative to the public education system. Second, the state
determines what kind of education the individual who is locked
into the system will get.' 72 Third, to the extent that poorer
individuals living in poorer districts are less likely to receive
adequate education, the legal apparatus of the state functions
to perpetuate or exacerbate wealth inequalities.' Lack of other
social welfare goods, such as food or housing, also may be attributable to educational deprivation by the state. But unlike
the lack of housing or food, which is only indirectly due to state
action, if at all, educational deprivation is directly determined
by the state. At least with regard to poor individuals, the state
determines what kind of education the individual receives.
These distinctions from other state services suggest that adequate education should be guaranteed by the federal courts.
There is also a fourth aspect to the state involvement
169.
170.
171.

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 112-19 supra.
See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity, supra note 4, at

388.
172. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,123-24
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, EducationalOpportunity, supra note 4, at 333, 335.
173. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, EducationalOpportunity, supra note 4, at
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issue. It directly implicates federal concerns and constitutes a
particularly strong rationale for a federally guaranteed right to
adequate education. As the above discussion suggests, it is entirely within the state's power to determine what kind of education most individuals will receive. For the federal government
to protect the constitutional rights and role of federal citizens
in this context is not an intrusion into legitimate state prerogatives, but a vindication of the values implicit in the Supremacy
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Such a constitutional right is therefore
fully consistent with-indeed, required by-principles of federalism.
The Rodriguez Court expressed a concern that enforcing a
constitutional right to education might involve excessive interference with state legislative and administrative determinations about state education systems.'74 The following section
suggests a content for the right to adequate education that
would not involve the degree of interference with state systems
feared by the Court.
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE EDUCATION: ITS CONTENT

The PracticalContent
Two possible contents for a right to adequate education
will be suggested; the contrast between the two is intended to
focus many of the tensions in this area. The first possibility to
be explored, the "minimum output standard," is formulated in
such a way that the Court might be persuaded to recognize it
today. The second, an "equalization principle," suggests the
potential evolution of the right.
The Minimum Output Standard
It is apparent that the "adequate education" presumed by
Rodriguez is an illusion for many children in public schools.
Functional illiteracy rates are soaring.' 75 "Social passing"-passing students in order to keep them with their grade
level although they have failed to master the subject matter of
the previous grade level-is accepted practice, and educational
failure is compounded until the illiterate or semi-literate stu174.
175.

411 U.S. at 40-44.
Functional illiteracy rates of twenty percent among high school graduates

are commonplace. See S. ENGELMAN,
(1969); J.

HOLT,

PREVENTING FAILURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

How CHILDREN FAIL (1967); Gard, supra note 4, at 9.
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17
dent is finally graduated from high school. Studies have
found actual academic regression among students in the public
schools.'77
The situation has become so dire that parents and students have resorted to suing the schools on various tort theories. A characteristic suit of this genre is Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District.t8 The plaintiff was a nineteenyear-old graduate of Galileo High School who, although he suffered no educational disability and attended school regularly,
was functionally illiterate; that is, he could not read at a sixthgrade level. A number of similar actions have been filed
throughout the United States."' While not notably successful
in the courts,'"s these suits emphasize the current crisis in public education.
The very least that an exegesis of the Court's pronouncement in Rodriguez would seem to require is that every student
acquire a reading level adequate for meaningful access to the
political system.' Clearly, no such guarantee is being provided; a large number of the nation's schoolchildren lack even
the minimal level of skills necessary for enjoyment of constitutional access rights.""
177. •"The 1964 Haryow Report showed actual academic regression in New York
City's Harlem where 'twenty-two per cent of the third grade students in that area were
reading above grade level, while thirty per cent were reading below grade level ...
By the sixth grade twelve per cent were reading above grade level, and eighty-one
percent were reading below grade level'." Gard, supra note 4, at 5, citing NEW YORK:
HARLEM YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC., YOUTH IN THE GHETTO 168-70 (1964).
See also R. HURLEY, POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDING (1969); B. BLOOM, A. DAVIS & R.
HESS, COMPENSATORY EDUCATION FOR CULTURAL DEPRIVATION 74 (1965).

178. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
179. See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 95 Misc. 2d 1, 408
N.Y.S. 2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977), affd, 64 A.D. 2d 29, 407 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1978) (dismissed
for failure to state a claim); Garret v. School Bd. of Broward County, Case No. 778703 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 1977). See Note, Educational Malpractice: When Can
Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Educational
Malpractice].
180. See Educational Malpractice,supra note 179.
However, several federal courts have held that mentally retarded and non-English
speaking children have a constitutional right to education. See, e.g., Serena v. Protales
Mun. School, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp.
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
These cases are exhaustively surveyed in Note, The Right to Education:A Constitutional Analysis, 44 U. CINN. L. REv. 796 (1975).
181. See 411 U.S. at 36-37.
182. See Gard, supra note 4, at 3-10; Educational Malpractice,supra note 179,
at 117.
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Therefore, one possible content for the right to education
would prescribe demonstrated achievement levels in certain
basic skills sufficient for access to the political system. The
narrowest definition of such skills would simply require basic
literacy; reading ability on an eighth-grade level or above. The
Court implied a definition of this sort in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 3
where it suggested that education to an eighth-grade level
would satisfy most governmental interests in education.", 4 A
literacy standard would at least guarantee that all students
would exercise their franchise with some minimum level of
comprehension about the issues.
A somewhat broader standard would require that students
be able to pass basic high school competency tests.'85 This standard may be desirable for two reasons: First, it increases the
probability that students will be able to secure employment
and survive in our competitive economy, which may be necessary if they are to have any real political power beyond simple
exercise of the franchise;' 8 second, it increases the probability
that students will have been educated to some level of political
sophistication. This standard, however, may go beyond the
minimal level of meaningful access to political rights that the
Court is willing to guarantee.8 7
Either of the above definitions, but particularly the former, has significant advantages in terms of actually having the
Court recognize a right to adequate education. Most obviously,
of course, it responds to Rodriguez's point that only that level
of education necessary for basic access to political rights is
guaranteed; complicated social science data is hardly required
for a court to recognize that literacy is necessary to secure these
rights.
In addition, either of these standards seems reasonably
well-suited to judicial enforcement. The standards are simple
and readily comprehensible.18 Most school systems already
administer the tests necessary to monitor compliance,8s and
intervention into state educational or fiscal policy making
183. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
184. Id. at 234.
185. See Gard, supra note 4, at 29-34.
186. See text accompanying notes 142-48 supra.
187. See 411 U.S. at 35-37.
188. See Kurland, supra note 4, at 592. Kurland argues that simplicity and
comprehensibility are the sine qua non of an effective constitutional principle, and of
effective judicial action.
189. See Gard, supra note 4, at 32-33.
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would be limited. The state would be free to fund and experiment as it wished, so long as compliance with the constitutional standard resulted. Obviously, some sort of "good-faith"
hedge would be required; states could not be expected to educate the uneducable, or to otherwise work miracles. But states
could be required to demonstrate an allocation of resources
consistent with the constitutional standard, and progress towards its realization. Some conduct, such as "social passing"
or failure to provide remedial reading programs would clearly
be inconsistent with the standard. 9 0
The above approach is not so unprecedented as it may at
first seem; Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II)III upheld a court's
power to do essentially what would be required to enforce the
adequate education right. The Supreme Court held that federal courts could order remedial education programs as part of
a school desegregation decree.' The remedial education order
that the Court upheld included four elements: remedial read3
ing, in-service training of teachers, testing, and counseling."
Similarly, a court enforcing the right to adequate education
could order remedial programs of various kinds, such as an end
to social passing. Alternatively, the court could simply find
that the state or school district was not behaving consistently
with the constitutional principle, and order the state or the
school district to formulate a remedial plan, as has been done
in the school desegregation cases.
An output standard also avoids the cost-quality dilemma
which has confounded other attempts to define adequate edu190. This kind of "good faith" determination has been made by courts in various
areas. One such area is school desegregation. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977) (Milliken II); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Another area is that of enforcement of Executive Order 11246. The Executive
Order requires government contractors to set "goals and time tables" for affirmative

action. However, employers who fail to meet their goal are not automatically deemed

to be in violation of the Executive Order; rather, the OFCC, and the courts on appeal,
must determine if the employer has made a good-faith effort to meet his goal. See
generally Contractors' Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
For a useful general discussion of Executive Order 11246, see B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 509-59 (1975).
191. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
192. Id. at 279.
193. Id. at 275-77. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, wrote that "the
remedy does not 'exceed' the violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the 'condition
that offends the Constitution.' Milliken I." (Citations omitted). Id. at 282.
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cation. A majority of studies have indicated that there is no
strong correlation between expenditures and educational quality. 9 While there are persuasive arguments as to why these
studies should not be regarded as definitive'95 and the issue is
anything but settled, the cost-quality issue as it has evolved to
date creates significant difficulties for an equal resources (or
"inputs") standard of adequacy. Problems remain even if one
accepts that dollars do matter-either because they are necessary, even if not sufficient, for adequate education, or because
the insistence of parents and school districts on local control of
funding, ratified by Rodriguez, is nonsensical in the absence of
a cost-quality relationship.'
Thus, the output standard provides a content for the right
to adequate education which is judicially palatable, and which
satisfies the implicit requirements and limitations of
Rodriguez. It offers a possible basis on which to persuade courts
to recognize that the state has an affirmative obligation to
provide each individual with the basic education required for
meaningful access to his or her federal political rights-rights
which can later be broadened in light of increased understanding of complex issues of educational policy such as the relation
of cost to quality. The standard offers promise that the adequate education presumed to exist in Rodriguez can become a
reality.
194.

A partial list of the major literature on the cost-quality issue includes: J.

COLEMAN, supra note 4; J. GUTHRIE, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971); C. JENCKS, supra

note 4; D. Moynihan & F. Mosterllar, supra note 4; A. WISE, supra note 4; Billings &
Leglar, supra note 4; McDermott & Klein, supra note 4.
195. See J. GUTHRIE, supra note 194; Billings & Leglar, supra note 4; McDermott
& Klein, supra note 4.
Billings & Leglar argue that the Coleman and Jencks studies used national data
and failed to control for problems inherent in such a data base, such as
"noncomparable salary-teacher quality variations." Billings & Leglar, supra note 4, at
633. Their study of Georgia school financing, controlling for cultural and teacher-salary
variations, found positive cost-quality correlations.
But see D. Moynihan & F. Mosteller, supra note 4 (controlling for alleged imperfections in Coleman's methodology and reaching Coleman's results).
McDermott & Klein make more far-reaching criticisms of current social science
data on the cost-quality relationship. See McDermott & Klein, supra note 4, at 423.
They have five basic criticisms. First, the data depends on achievement tests, which
do not fully overlap with school program objectives. Second, the tests are culturally
biased; they do not measure what they purport to measure. Third, the expenditure
index does not properly match inputs and outputs, e.g., it includes spending not
directly related to educational achievement. Fourth, the data analysis techniques confuse statistical correlationwith causation. Fifth, current studies are all flawed by a
variety of methodological defects. Id. at 423-35.
196. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lindquist & Wise, supra note 4, at 12.
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The Equalization Principle
Ultimately, adequate education can be attained only by
striving for equal education, just as an adequate vote must be
an equal vote. Only equal education can break the "Cycle of
Non-Access" adverted to previously in this article. Political
rights are competitive; the degree of political access or power
enjoyed by one individual is only significant relative to that
enjoyed by other individuals. Our economy is similarly competitive. 9"' 7 Furthermore, access to political rights-lobbying,
channels of communication-are significantly a function of
economic power, and cases such as First NationalBank of Boston v. Bellottil s and Buckley v. Valeol" suggest that this will
continue to be unmitigatedly true. Thus, in the long run, adequate education and equal education become one. 2°0
For the present, however, there are severe problems with
the equal education principle. First, the data simply do not
exist to support or fine-tune the theory. No one yet knows what
educational "inputs" will produce desired educational outcomes. Still less can we demonstrate precise correlations between allocation of educational resources and effective exercise
of political rights or successful competition in the market economy. In any case, it is futile to argue for any of the various
formulas for equal inputs because Rodriguez clearly rejected
any such formula, at least until it is based on something far
more precise than this type of theoretical speculation. Even
with judicial recognition of an equal education goal it is not
clear that implementation would be possible.
Second, it seems futile to require equal expenditures if
they are not related to educational quality. Professor Richards
argues that providing equal "opportunity" is morally justified
in itself; 2°' a related argument may be that equal funding is
197. A number of state courts have been willing to require school finance equalization, even in the absence of a clearly demonstrated cost-quality relationship. See,
e.g. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976); Horton
v. Meskill, 175 Conn. 615 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
198. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
199. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
200. See, e.g., Karst, Serrano v. Priest'sInputs and Outputs, 38 LAw & CONTEMP.
PsOB. 333, 393-95 (1974); Michelman, supra note 8, at 49-59 (arguing that in education,
"the minimum is significantly a function of the maximum").
201. Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral
Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41 U. CI. L. REv. 32 (1973). Richards argues
that society's responsibility is to provide each individual with equal "opportunities"

(education is so defined) to compete for all other goods. However, he does not discuss
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necessary, although not sufficient, for equal education. However, both these arguments assume a correlation that the data
do not yet support. And, again, the Court implicitly rejected
this approach in Rodriguez.
Third, it is not mere equality that is desired, but quality
as well; Professor Kurland argues that quality is the real goal. 20
An equal-expenditures requirement does not guarantee even a
minimally adequate education to anyone. But Coons, Clune
and Sugarman assume that the affluent and politically powerful will guarantee that an adequate education is provided to all,
once equality is forced upon them.303 Professor Kurland disagrees, arguing that the affluent will simply opt out of the public
system and throw their support to other political goals, such as
tax relief. 04 Especially in this Proposition 13 era, an equal
funding principle, then, may mean inadequate funding for all
districts, because those with the economic and political power
to support the schools will have no incentive to do so.
For now, minimally adequate education, defined in terms
of outputs, is the best we can hope for. It at least establishes
that there is a constitutional right to adequate education,
against the day when we do have the means to prove that
adequate education is equal education, and to guarantee that
equal education will be provided for all.
The Legal Content
What is the constitutional basis for contending that where
the state provides public education it is affirmatively obligated
to provide adequate education to all its citizens? The obvious
possibilities are substantive due process and equal protection.
Substantive due process seems far more conducive to a right
which requires that a limited, finite access to a particular service must be provided to each individual. Equal protection has
a more relativistic focus. Moreover, to the extent that the
how providing equally expensive education to all individuals furthers this opportunity
principle if expenditures do not correlate to quality.
A more sophisticated analysis along similar lines is offered by Professor Michelman. See Michelman, In Pursuit of ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962 (1973). However, Michelman's theory goes
far into the realm already rejected by Rodriguez.
202. See Kurland, supra note 4, at 590-92.
203. See generally Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity, supra
note 4. But see Clune, School Finance, supra note 4, at 670-75.
204. See Kurland, supra note 4 at 591; Clune, School Finance, supra note 4 at
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Burger Court perceives equalization principles to be inconsistent with the basic competitive framework of the American
system, 20 5 it might be more comfortable with a right defined in
substantive due process terms. The Court might view such a
right as more clearly constrained to the narrow terms of
"adequacy" than a right which, however narrowly defined, was
lodged in the equal protection clause with all its equalizing
implications.
Finally, doctrinal considerations may seem to militate
against locating the adequate education right in the equal protection clause. The equalizing principle, it may be argued, has
an important role to play in the constitutional scheme, a role
that should not be diluted by semantic attempts to assimilate
"minimum" to "equal." Two individuals, both of whom are
"adequately" educated, may yet be unequally educated.
All these arguments have considerable force, and plaintiffs
should certainly consider a substantive due process approach
as a litigation strategy. Nevertheless, the right to adeqhate
education should, if possible, be lodged in the equal protection
clause.
Initially, whatever harm such an analysis could do to the
equal protection clause has already been done; in Ross v.
Moffitt,2 "0Justice Rehnquist firmly located the right of minimally adequate access to state criminal appeals in the equal
protection clause. 20 7 Furthermore, the Court's choosing to locate the right in the equal protection clause when there was a
more-than-adequate basis for locating it in the due process
clause suggests that the Court is not overly alarmed by the
arguably more expansive potential of equal protection analysis.
An even stronger reason for using the equal protection
clause is that the adequacy principle and the equal protection
08
principle are not as distinct as they may seem. The voting
cases offer an instance where adequacy and equality converged.209 That a similar convergence of adequacy and equality
will one day occur in the educational sphere as well is argued
in some detail above. Constitutional convergence of adequacy
and equality will be facilitated if the right to adequate education is already identified with the equal protection guarantee.
205.

See generally L. TaIB, supra note 103, at 1132-34.

206. 417 U.S. 600 (1973).
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 611.
See text accompanying notes 200-207 supra.
See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
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CONCLUSION

The subliminal holding of the Rodriguez decision may well
have been that there is a right to adequate education. This
right is closely analogous to those rights recognized in several
other strands of "access cases;" it is identical in several key
respects. In addition, adequate education is the sine qua non
of the larger right, suggested by these cases, of meaningful
access to the American political system. Furthermore, the right
to adequate education is not only consistent with, but strongly
supported by, the federalism concerns that were evident in the
Rodriguez decision.
The adequate-education approach suggests a way in which
the Supreme Court may be brought to recognize, however, tentatively at first, that states have an affirmative obligation to
provide their citizens with the education necessary for meaningful access to the federal political system. This right, once
established, is capable of evolution consistent with both the
evolution of our social science capabilities and our evolution as
a just and humane people.

